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IN 
OF 
THE 
THE 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CARL R. SESSIONS, 
Third-Party Defendant and 
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Case No. 
11350 
DONNE. CASSITY, EUGENE H. DAVIS, and FORD 
G. SCALLEY, Attorneys representing numerous clients 
whose interests coincide with the issue herein, were 
granted leave by order of the court on November 8, 1968 
to appear as Amicus Curiae. For the sake of brevity, the 
Amicus Curiae accepts statement of the case and the 
facts as set forth in Respondent's Brief and will limit its 
discussion to matters which it feels merit consideration 
to assist the court in determining the issues of whether 
as a matter of law a right of subrogation of medical pay 
coverage under the State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company Policy does or does not exist. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THE MEDICAL SUBROGATION 
CLAUSE IN THE STATE FARM INSURANCE COM-
PANY AUTO POLICY WAS VALID. 
The real issues presented by the question of whether 
the medical subrogation clause in the State Farm Auto 
Policy should be allowed, have been masked behind the 
property damage subrogation doctrine. The insurance 
industry has convinced some of the courts that subroga-
tion is necessary to preclude "double recovery" or any 
form of unjust enrichment. Such an appeal to emotion 
should be inspected on its merits by this court and not 
just accepted. The courts who have allowed medical pay r 
subrogation have failed to push analysis beyond anything 
but consecrated phrases drafted by the insurance in-
dustry and have failed to formulate anew. 
In looking at this problem logically and equitably we 
find no valid reason for allowing medical subrogation 
"privilege". An interesting analysis of this question which 
is certainly apropos in this case is found in Richards, The 
Law of Insurance, Vol. 2, Sec. 183, 184, pages 652 through 
655: 
"SECTION 183. Subrogation; Nature of the right 
generally ... 
It has been often stated that subrogation is a creature 
of equity growing out of natural justice or a desire 
to work out a fair adjustment between parties by ! 
securing the ultimate discharge of a debt. Subroga-
3 
tion is also described as a substitution of another 
person in the place of the creditor to whose rights he 
succeeds in relation to the debt, giving substitute all 
the rights, priorities, remedies, liens and securities 
of the person for whom he is substituted. Thus, upon 
payment of loss or damage to the insured, the insurer 
is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right or 
action which the insured may have against a third 
party responsible for the loss or damage sustained by 
the insured. This equitable right of subrogation is 
derivative from the legal effect of payment and 
inures to the insurer without any formal assignment 
or any express policy stipulation. 
However, upon closer examination it is submitted 
that this equitable right of subrogation is neither 
"equitable" nor a "right'', but constitutes a valuable 
privilege bestowed upon an insurance company by 
courts long indifferent to the doctrine of true indem-
nity in their zeal to respect the literal language of 
such unilateral contracts of insurance. Courts have 
mouthed the utterances of astute insurance counsel 
that subrogation is necessary to preclude double 
recovery by insured or any form of unjust enrich-
ment gained from the prosecution of claims against 
both the insurer and the tort-feasor causing the loss 
of damage. But the same courts, not cognizant of the 
impracticability of such double recovery by the in-
sured have again overlooked the axiom that it is 
equally unjust to preclude the insurer from suffering 
a loss that it had expressly agreed to assume as a 
risk in return for the payment of premiums. As Pro-
fessor Patterson has so aptly commented 'Subroga-
tion is a windfall to the insurer.' It plays no part in 
the rate schedules (or only a minor one), and no 
reduction is made in insuring interests such as that 
of the secured creditors, where the subrogation right 
will obviously be worth something. Hence in such a 
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case no reason appears for extending it . . . 'The 
doctrine of subrogation was conceived unilaterally 
nurtured unilaterally, and cast on the courts for th; 
unilateral interest of insurers generally. It must be 
thoroughly re-examined from time to time.'" 
"SECTION 184, Subrogation, and the Insurer 
This right of subrogation affords the property insurer 
one of its most valuable privileges, enabling it to 
recover from a third person as much as it has paid 
the insured under the policy for loss or damage." 
We respectfully submit that the time has come for this i 
court to examine this attempt by the insurance in-
dustry to extend the property subrogation doctrine to 
include the medical payment provision under an auto 
policy or any other policy with the attendant circum-
stances of a unilateral insurance contract, the terms of 
which are out of the control of the insured who has no 
real bargaining position. We would agree that the sacred 
right of freedom to contract must not be interfered with 
as long as both parties to such contracts are on equal 
footing. In the instant case justice demands that there be 
some protection for the public when entering into such 
unilateral contracts. If the insurance industry wants to 
have this right to subrogate then they should be required 
to offer to the insured a policy with such subrogation 
privileges at a somewhat reduced rate, rather than re-
ceive the privilege of subrogation for nothing. Then and 
only then will the principal of freedom of contract be 
protected. 
While the general doctrine of subrogation in property 
damage cases should be re-evaluated there are at 
least more convincing public policy considerations ap-
plicable to property damage subrogation than there are 
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to justify subrogation in the area of medical pay cover-
age. The reasoning in the property damage cases for al-
lowing subrogation is that such allowance discourages 
carelessness. Such is not the case with medical pay sub-
rogation where one is not likely to injure himself because 
of the ability to pay. Since we as insureds have paid our 
company to take the risk of negligent losses then why 
should the company without consideration be permitted 
to shift the loss to another. 
While there may be many people who might be care-
less with their property, in our opinion, there would not 
be many willing to intentionally injure themselves for a 
few dollars. Those who would argue that there would 
be many who would run up bills and costs because of in-
juries for a profit should be aware of the standard clause 
which states that the company will only be obligated "To 
pay reasonable medical expenses incurred within one 
year from the date of the accident." See State Farm Auto 
Policy 9520.6 MS Page 2, Coverage C - Medical Payments. 
It should also be noted that these same insurance policies 
state that "As soon as practicable the injured person or 
someone on his behalf shall give to the company written 
notice of claim, and upon request shall make medical re-
ports and copies of records available to the company and 
that the injured person when requested is required to 
submit to physical examination by a physician selected 
by the company. See State Farm Auto Policy, 9520.6MS, 
Page 4 paragraph 12, Notice and Payment of Claim. 
The above clauses which are standard in such policies 
adequately protect the insurance company against fraud. 
We ask this court to evaluate such public policy consider-
ations instead of falling into the trap nurtured by the in-
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surers by finding a public policy reason to justify an end 
result without specifically analyzing the problem for 
purposes of intellectual rest. A good example of falling 
into this trap is found in Traveller's Insurance Company 
vs. Lutz 210 N.E.2d 755 (1964), a case cited in Respond-
ent's Brief. In that case the court without any examina-
tion of the problem whatever stated, in general terms 
that it found it impossible to see why it was unfair or a~ 
improper result to allow medical subrogation since the 
parties were free to contract as they desired. The court in 
Wilson vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. 411 S.W. 
2d 699 (1966), likewise failed to evaluate the problem and 
held with sweeping generalizations that no unfairness 
existed in such contracts. 
This court is now faced with the problem of whether 
or not the insurance industry is going to be permitted to 
extend the subrogation doctrine to the medical pay 
clauses in auto policies. Such an extension cannot in logic 
or equity be justified in light of careful analysis of the 
public policy considerations. The argument made by the 
Insurance Industry "that if medical pay subrogation is 
not allowed the insured will get a double recovery" is 
nonsense on stilts. The insured is getting from the insurer 
what he paid a premium for while the company is paying 
for what it agreed to take the risk for. The consideration 
for receiving payment from the tort-feasor is that said 
tort-feasor caused injury. The consideration for receiving 
from the company the medical payments under the policy 
is that the insured paid a premium. If medical subroga-
tion is permitted, the "windfall" inures to the Insurance 
Company where the sum of the premium is added not 
deducted to the windfall. If subrogation is denied, the 
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insured is getting what he paid a premium for, and at 
least his "windfall" or "double recovery" is deducted by 
the amount of the premium. Just who is really getting the 
''double recovery"? 
Subrogation has been nothing more than a source of 
windfall to the insurers who have failed to reflect any 
such anticipated recoveries in the computation of their 
rates. The medical subrogation clause was first intro-
duced in the State Farm policies in the early sixties. Their 
new policies currently coming out are taking advantage 
of the opportunity to extend the concept of subrogation 
to include medical payments. By that they are creating a 
"windfall" and escaping an obligation they agreed to as-
swne when they charged their premiums. Their new 
policy issued September of 1968, Form No. 9520.7, page 
13, Section 9, paragraph 2, cleverly provides as follows: 
"Under coverages C and M, if the injured person has 
other insurance of any type of a medical or surgical 
reimbursement plan applicable to the payment of 
such medical expenses, the company shall not be 
liable for a greater proportion of such loss than the 
applicable limit of liability bears to the total ap-
plicable limit of liability of all collectible insurance 
against such loss." 
For very convenient reasons the insurance industry 
looks with abhorrence upon the situation where an in-
sured is compensated for a premium he paid and also 
from an injury he suffered. However, that same industry 
also for convenient reasons sees nothing so abhorrent 
when it accepts the full premiums from their insureds 
and at the same time attempts to escape from the risk it 
agreed to take. Medical pay subrogation penalizes those 
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individuals who have been prudent enough to pay for pro-
tection by sending in premiums. If subrogation is allowed 
in this area of third-party tortfeasor liability the person 
who does not have any insurance will in most instances 
recover the same amount as the insured who pays the 
extra premium. The medical pay subrogation clause 
would penalize those of us who in our attempts to fill the ' 
medical cost gap have purchased more than one medical 
policy in that we would only be able to recover once 
despite the separate agreements to pay, and then under 
the new pro-rata clause, even that one recovery would be 
piece-meal, requiring us to negotiate with all the com-
panies involved in order to collect much less than what 
we paid for. 
Further penalty would enure to the insured who pays 
a premium for such coverage when he is involved in a 
personal injury accident who must pay the costs of hiring 
a lawyer to obtain a settlement or judgment for his pain 
and suffering and medical expenses, when the costs of 
such litigation must come out of his gross recovery. 
Under the medical subrogation clause the insurance com· 
pany is entitled to the entire amount of the medical pay 
which it paid out without the insurance company having 
to pay its fair share of the expense of collecting the same. 
One need only take time to analyze this situation to con· 
elude that the equities weigh heavily in favor of the 
insured. 
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POINT II 
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT 
OF WHETHER OR NOT SUBROGATION SHOULD BE 
EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE MEDICAL PAYMENT 
CLAUSE, SHOULD NOT BE DECIDED BY RESORT-
ING TO ASSIGNMENT OF TORT DISTINCTIONS. 
The cases cited by both Appellant and Respondent get 
bogged down on whether the medical pay subrogation 
provision is or is not an assignment of a personal injury 
tort action. Such an approach begs any analysis of what 
we are dealing with. Who cares whether it is or isn't an 
assignment of a tort. The issue we are really faced with 
is whether the doctrine of subrogation should be ex-
tended to include the medical payment provision under 
a unilateral contract bargaining situation. SUBROGA-
TION IS AN EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE. Since subroga-
tion is an equitable principle, then we should decide the 
issue in this case by resorting to what is equitable under 
the circumstances and not by resorting to "fig-leaf" ex-
pressions of law which cover up blind ignorance. The 
issue in this case should not be decided by resorting to 
semantics but by what is equitable. 
Respondent seems to rely quite heavily on the case of 
Davenport vs. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Com-
pany, 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965). The court in that 
case overruled the old common law doctrine of not al-
lowing an assignment of a right to sue in tort for per-
sonal injuries and without any more analysis concluded 
that there was no reason why medical subrogation could 
not be allowed. The court in that case incorrectly ignores 
the fact that subrogation is an equitable doctrine and 
instead relied on the legal right to assign a tort. 
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The Respondent on page 11 of his brief cites the case 
of Travelers Insurance Co. vs. Lutz, 210 N.E.2d 755 
I 
(1964) and refers to language by that court which im-
plies that as long as the State Insurance Commission has 
full authority to control companies, and fails to take any 
action to prevent an invalid policy provision, that such 
policy provision must therefore be sustained. Such an 
argument is ridiculous. For instance, the Utah State In-
surance Commission failed to outlaw binding arbitration 
provisions in Uninsured Motorists Insurance. The mere 
fact some state government employees failed to ban such 
a provision didn't keep the Utah Supreme Court in Barn- I 
hart vs. Civil Service Employees Insurance Co., 4 Utah 1
1 
2d, 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965) from concluding that such 
mandatory provisions were against public policy. i 
CONCLUSION 
There should be no extension of the subrogation doc· 
trine to include medical pay clauses in insurance con· 
tracts there being no equitable basis on which to support 
such an extension. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONNE. CASSITY 
EUGENE H. DA VIS 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
I 
I 
